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Abstract
Estimating the impact of bank mergers on credit granted and on interest rates re-
quires a framework that allows to disentangle the eﬀect of changes in market structure
generated by mergers from the eﬀects arising from changes in banks’ operating environ-
ment. However, most of the literature on thei m p a c to fb a n km e r g e r sr e l i e so nas i m p l e
diﬀerential analysis of the relevant variables. We propose a new methodology. It relies
on the estimation of a structural model of the credit market. Using this model we are
able to derive a counterfactual scenario, considering the pre-merger market equilibrium
together with the post-merger environment. The counterfactual analysis makes possible
to take into account changes in market structure and conduct, which could aﬀect the re-
sults if neglected. We analyze separately two segments of the credit market (households
and ﬁrms) and take into account two groups of institutions (those that were directly
involved in mergers and those that were not). We ﬁnd that mergers increased the total
amount of credit granted to the corporate sector, but had negative impacts on house-
holds’ access to credit. Moreover, we ﬁnd that mergers led to a widespread decrease in
interest rates.
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In this paper wea n a l y z et h ee ﬀects bank mergers exert on market structure and credit con-
ditions. The conventional approach employed in the literature relies on the comparison of
market characteristics before and after the mergers, overlooking changes in market structure
in the post-merger industry equilibrium. For example, in order to evaluate the ex-ante poten-
tial impact of mergers, competition authorities usually conduct merger simulation analysis1.
In this paper, we present a methodology that allows overcoming this gap in the evaluation
of merger impact. By deriving a structural model for the credit market, we are able to per-
form a counterfactual analysis of mergers, combining the pre-merger equilibrium setting with
characteristics of the post-merger environment. Using this procedure we are able to estimate
loan ﬂows and interest rates that would be observed if the pre-merger equilibrium was not
altered, i.e., if mergers had not occurred. By conducting this analysis, we are able to obtain
more accurate estimates of the impact of mergers, given that we are able to take into account
the eﬀects associated with changes in conduct and market structure after the mergers take
place. These eﬀects are usually ignored in the assessment of merger impact and can lead to a
signiﬁcant bias in the results obtained. Moreover, we are able disentangle the eﬀect of changes
in the exogenous environment from changes in market structure resulting from the mergers.
Hence, this methodology can be an important additional tool for competition authorities when
assessing the impact of mergers, allowing for the estimation of what would have happened if
a merger had not taken place.
We apply the proposed methodology to a detailed dataset with unique characteristics. This
dataset covers a banking system which went through a wave of mergers, thus constituting an
ideal lab to estimate a counterfactual scenario. Our dataset allows to investigate the merger
impact on ﬁrm and household bank loans separately2. Moreover, we are able to analyze the
merger eﬀects on both the merged banks and on those banks outside the merging circles,
1See, for instance, Epstein and Rubinfeld (2000) or, for a more recent approach, Goppelsroeder et al (2008).
2Beck et al (2009) provide evidence regarding the importance of analyzing household and ﬁrm loans sepa-
rately.
2taking into account changes in the post-merger market structure. Furthermore, we analyze
the resulting changes in local market structure by modelling the eﬀects of changes in local
market structure on the aggregate industry conﬁguration.
There is a large literature on the gains banks obtain from merging. For instance, Focarelli
et al (2002) ﬁnd that mergers increase return on equity, but they also lead to a rise in staﬀ
costs. In turn, they ﬁnd that acquisitions generate a long-term reduction in lending, mainly
for small ﬁrms, and a permanent decrease in bad quality loans, which positively aﬀects long-
run proﬁtability. Focusing on European mergers, Altunbas and Marqués (2008) ﬁnd that
improvements in banks’ performance subsequent to mergers are more signiﬁcant if there are
strategic similarities between the merging banks. Mergers also generate important changes in
market structure, as discussed in Berger et al (2004), Cerasi et al (2010) or in Gowrisankaran
and Holmes (2004). Some authors also ﬁnd that mergers may enhance cost reduction and
improve resource allocation3. Moreover, mergers may generate informational gains, which
improve banks’ screening abilities and customer discrimination (see, for instance, Hauswald
and Marquez (2006) or Panetta et al (2009)). In turn, Beck et al (2006) show that bank
mergers may have implications on ﬁnancial stability
It is also important to assess the impact of bank mergers on customers with varying
characteristics. Several authors conclude that bank mergers may negatively aﬀect borrowers,
most notably if they are small and medium size ﬁrms, dependent on bank funding and with a
limited number of bank relationships. For instance, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007) ﬁnd
that, for a sample of Italian ﬁrms, bank mergers have a negative eﬀect on credit, particularly if
the lending relationship comes to an end after the merger, even though this eﬀect should persist
only during the three years after the merger. However, this negative eﬀect is not suﬃcient
to generate a negative impact on ﬁrms’ investment or cash-ﬂow sensitivity. Other authors
ﬁnd mixed evidence regarding the impact of bank mergers. Also using a sample of Italian
3For instance, Carbó Valverde and Humphrey (2004) argue that mergers should reduce costs faced by
banks, raise their return on assets and improve general resource utilization. They also ﬁnd that a merger
is more likely to be successful if it is large (scale eﬀect) and also if it is initiated by a bank that has been
previously involved in a merger (learning eﬀect).
3ﬁrms, Sapienza (2002) concludes that in-market mergers beneﬁt borrowers if these mergers
involve banks with limited market power. However, as the market share of the acquired bank
increases, the eﬃciency gains are oﬀs e tb ya ni n c r e a s ei nm a r k e tp o w e r ,w h i c hm a yi m p l ya
decrease in loan supply, especially to small borrowers. In another study, Scott and Dunkelberg
(2003) analyze the results of a survey on US ﬁrms and ﬁnd that bank mergers do not aﬀect
loan supply or interest rates, even though there is some deterioration in non-price loan terms,
such as fees for speciﬁc services. Degryse et al (2009) ﬁnd that the impact of a bank merger
is more negative for smaller borrowers and for single relationship borrowers. Moreover, target
bank borrowers should be more harmed by the merger than borrowers of the acquiring bank.
Finally, Karceski et al (2005) show that mergers may have impacts on borrowers beyond credit
availability and interest rates. These authors show that mergers may in fact have important
consequences on ﬁrm value, observing that borrowers of the acquiring banks usually beneﬁt
from the mergers, whereas ﬁrms that borrow from the target bank suﬀer an opposite impact4,
5.
In the present paper, we use a structural model of equilibrium in credit markets to analyze
the impact of changes in market factors due to the merger wave. First we estimate the
diﬀerential impact of the merger wave, by exploring changes in local competition and in
coordination moves between banks. Using the structural model, we are able to go further and
estimate a counterfactual scenario for the post-merger period, thus going beyond the simple
(and insuﬃcient) comparison of variables before and after mergers occur, which is usually
performed for the assessment of merger impact. Using this methodology, we compare the
interest rate and credit ﬂows in the post-merger equilibrium setup with the value of these
variables under a counterfactual equilibrium. This counterfactual equilibrium is estimated
4There is less work done on the impact of bank mergers on depositors. There is some empirical evidence for
Italian ﬁrms which suggests that bank mergers may have positive consequences for depositors in the long-run,
even though there may be some negative eﬀects in the short run (Focarelli and Panetta, 2003). However,
Craig and Dinger (2009), using US data, obtain a diﬀerent result, given that they do not observe any positive
long-term eﬀect of mergers on deposit interest rates. Their results are consistent with previous work done by
Prager and Hannan (1998).
5For a more detailed review of the recent literature on the impact of bank mergers, please see DeYoung et
al (2009).
4using the after-merger exogenous environment under the pre-merger market structure.
The estimation of counterfactuals to assess the impacts of a merger may be considered an
important policy tool. For instance, Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) emphasize that the evaluation
of a merger from a policy perspective should not be based solely on a static comparative
analysis, but should also consider dynamic eﬀects and alternative merger scenarios. Berry
and Pakes (1993) also argue that static models of equilibrium do not take into account the
long-run reactions of merging and non-merging ﬁrms, thus generating misleading results. In an
application to the airline industry, Peters (2006) demonstrates the importance of designing a
counterfactual analysis to evaluate the impact of mergers, but is silent regarding the possibility
of collusion or strategic interactions between ﬁrms. Berger et al (1998) ﬁnd empirical evidence
which supports the view that the dynamic eﬀects of mergers may generate results diﬀerent
from those obtained with static analysis. The authors identify a decrease in lending to small
business after a merger, even though this static eﬀect is largely oﬀset by dynamic eﬀects
associated with changes in the focus of the merging banks or with the reaction of other banks.
Nevertheless, these authors do not consider local changes induced by mergers, neither do they
compare the impact on diﬀerent institutional sectors.
Our paper contributes to the literature on merger impact in banking markets by presenting
a counterfactual analysis, based on a structural model of equilibrium that clearly disentangles
the eﬀects of bank mergers on loan ﬂows and interest rates and takes into account changes in
market structure and conduct that may occur after the merger takes place. Our analysis is
based on loan ﬂows, as opposed to outstanding amounts, thus allowing us to better capture
changes in credit markets over time. Moreover, the data used allows us to discriminate eﬀects
among corporate and household borrowers, and to simulate the counterfactual equilibrium to
the mergers that occurred. This approach lends itself to the reporting of intuitive measures
of merger impact upon the degree of competition in the market. The use of a counterfactual
scenario becomes necessary, as mergers change the market structure underlying bank compe-
tition. In particular, as borrowers’ choices among alternative banks often take place in small
local markets (even though banks’ policies can be national), the softening of competition in
5local markets resulting from a merger may be larger than an estimate based on aggregate,
country-wide, ﬁgures.
W ea r ea b l et om a k eu s eo fas i g n i ﬁcant change in market structure in the Portuguese
banking market. Portugal is a small economy participating in the European Union, and joined
the euro area at its inception. Like in the other European Union countries, it experienced a
wave of mergers in the banking sector. The most signiﬁcant changes occurred in 2000, with
the merger of several ﬁnancial institutions. The almost simultaneous nature of these mergers
provides a natural break point in time, allowing us to deﬁne a pre- and a post-merger period.
Hence, we divide the 1995-2002 period in two: the pre-merger 1995-1999 period and the post-
merger 2000-2002 period. Four out of the seven major ﬁnancial groups were directly involved
in those changes, either by selling or by acquiring at least one ﬁnancial institution. In this
paper, we analyze two diﬀerent products (credit to households and to ﬁrms), two diﬀerent
groups of institutions (those that are directly involved in the mergers and those that are not)
and consider two diﬀerent periods (pre- and post-mergers).
Several interesting ﬁndings emerge from our analysis. We ﬁnd that the 2000 merger wave
globally increased total credit granted and decreased interest rates. However, the analysis
of aggregate credit ﬂows hides important diﬀerences between institutional sectors. In fact,
we ﬁnd that the amount of credit ﬂow granted to the household sector decreased, while the
amount of credit granted to the corporate sector increased during the same period. The
changes in credit ﬂows aﬀe c t e db o t ht h eb a n k i n gg r o u p si n v o l v e di nt h em e r g e r sa n dt h e
groups not involved. In fact, all ﬁnancial institutions experienced an increase in the corporate
credit sold following the merger and a decrease in the interest rate charged. However, the
banks directly involved in the merger recorded a larger increase in corporate credit than the
b a n k st h a tw e r en o td i r e c t l yi n v o l v e di nt h em e r g e r . T h ed e c l i n ei nc r e d i tg r a n t e dt ot h e
household sector after the merger period, which was concentrated in banks not involved in
the merger wave, suggests that households may be more sensitive to changes in local market
competition. These results show that mergers may actually aﬀect the degree of competition
in the market, through the changes in the local market structure, to a larger extent than
6predicted by aggregate market analysis.
The results we derive from the counterfactuals are qualitatively consistent with those ob-
tained by estimating the diﬀerential impact of the mergers. In sum, we observe that potential
eﬃciency gains generated by the mergers seem to have been transmitted to customers through
lower lending rates6. Moreover, access to credit improved signiﬁcantly for ﬁr m sa f t e rt h em e r g -
ers, though the same was not observed for households. However, even though the results are
qualitatively similar in both methodologies, the counterfactual estimation allows for a more
precise quantiﬁcation of these impacts, while isolating changes in the exogenous environment
from changes in market structure. The results obtained suggest that changes in banks’ exoge-
nous environment were behind most of the changes in interest rates and loan ﬂows after the
merger.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model of the equilibrium in the
credit market. Section 3 describes the data and the major corporate changes in the banking
system in 2000. Section 4 estimates the structural model of equilibrium in the credit market
and section 5 analyzes the impact of the merger wave. We ﬁr s ta n a l y z et h ed i ﬀerential impact
of the merger wave, and then compare those results with the estimation of a counterfactual
scenario. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 The Analytical Framework
2.1 Demand Equation
Given our purpose of assessing the market equilibrium eﬀects of bank mergers, our approach
to estimation has to rely on a minimum structure, such that alternative market equilibria can
be computed. At the same time, the model needs to be parsimonious and ﬂexible. More-
over, changes in competition should be analyzed at the most disaggregated level possible.
Even though there is no information on the local market operations of each bank, we do have
information on the location of branches and on characteristics of local markets (such as pop-
6For a discussion on eﬃciency gains arising from bank mergers, see Sapienza (2002).
7ulation), thus allowing us to consider diﬀerences in local bank competition. In fact, as local
market competition certainly depends on the number and location of branches, the relative
position of the branch network of each bank does aﬀect the demand faced by the bank, and
thus own and rival banks branch densities are considered in our model. The branch density is
commonly used in the empirical literature on local banking competition (see, for instance, De-
gryse and Ongena, 2005). We consider that rivalry between banks is relevant on the choice of
interest rates. Finally, economy-wide variables should inﬂuence demand and must be included
as demand-side controls.
Since our unit of observation is the bank, we consider the total market demand function 
directed at each bank (), during a quarter (), as a function of both economy-wide variables
() and bank-level determinants ()7:
 =  
As mentioned above, loan demand, ,i sm e a s u r e db yl o a nﬂows, rather than outstanding
l o a n s ,t h u sc a p t u r i n gl o a nd e m a n di ne a c hq u a r t e r . T h es e to fv a r i a b l e s includes the
aggregate average interest rate on new loans granted in the country in quarter , ,a n d






where 0 is a constant, and 1 and 2 are parameters to be estimated.
The bank speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s ,, include the number of branches of a bank and of its rivals,
 and − =(  − ), respectively.
The overall demand directed at bank  is also determined by the level of competition the
bank faces in the local markets in which it is active, as well as by the relative size of such
markets. In fact, for a given number of branches, diﬀerent locations can imply signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in demand generated. Therefore, we include a set of local market competition
variables .
7See Kim and Vale (2001) for further details.










where 0 is a constant and 1, 2, 3 and 4, are parameters to be estimated. It is important
to note that in each period, the decision variable  is the average interest rate that bank 
charges on new loans granted during quarter , not the average interest rate on existing loans.
Pooling all variables together, the demand equation we estimate is:
ln = 0 +  + 1 ln + 2 ln + 1 ln + 2 ln− + 3 ln + 4 ln +  (1)
where 0 is a constant and  are bank ﬁxed eﬀects.
In expression (1),  stands for the total volume of (new) loans granted by bank  during
ap a r t i c u l a rq u a r t e r. We have district data and therefore  =
P
=1  ,w h e r e
stands for the district identiﬁcation8.
















where the sum is performed for all the districts in the country. The variable  is the sum
of the squares of the district local market competition values.
The variables capturing local market characteristics deserve some further justiﬁcation.
The ﬁrst one,  , is a measure of the importance of each market to bank  in period :
the proportion of branches each bank has in market  is weighted by the population in that
market. Thus, banks which have a higher proportion of branches in more heavily populated
areas will have, ceteris paribus, a higher demand for their loans.
The second measure, , attempts to capture not a rough indicator of the level of
8There are 18 districts in Portugal.
9potential demand in each market, but the intensity of competition. The basic element is
the share of (branch) competition faced by bank  in market . T h i si sg i v e nb yt h es h a r e
of rival banks in the total number of branches in market , weighted by the importance of
market ,b r a n c h - w i s e ,t ob a n k. This index can accommodate the diﬀerences involved in
having branches in markets where other banks have no branches relative to crowded markets.9
2.2 The Bank’s Problem
After setting the demand function faced by each bank, we turn now to the supply side of the
market. The proﬁt function of a bank relevant for our analysis, which focuses on the loans
market, can be simply stated as interest rate income less marginal costs multiplied by total
(new) loan demand in each period. Marginal costs include the opportunity cost of ﬁnancial
funds.
The relevant (short-run) decision variable of bank  is its interest rate. To account for
possible strategic interactions among banks belonging to diﬀerent economic groups, we take
a simple approach, assuming that they take into consideration the impact they have on the
proﬁts of other banks. Under perfect collusion (or joint management) banks would maximize
joint proﬁts, while under perfectly independent behavior each would maximize own proﬁts.
Thus, this approach accommodates intermediate situations by the introduction of a single
parameter, which measures to what extent a bank considers the impact of its decisions on the
proﬁts of other banks10.
T h eb a n k ’ sp r o b l e mi st om a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts using the interest rate as the control variable:
max





where  represents all remaining banks and  are marginal costs. Parameters  are the
competition factor that accounts for the eﬀect of bank  on bank ’s objective function. The
number of parameters implied by  is potentially quite large, and restrictions on possible
9A similar index can be found in Barros (1999).
10For further details, see Barros (1999).
10values will be imposed during estimation.
Using the demand equation deﬁned in the previous section, it becomes straightforward to


















































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a t(1 + )=[ Π
=1 (1 + )]
1 and  is the total number of
banks in quarter .













For estimation purposes, it becomes useful to solve the equation with respect to the interest














( − )+ +  (2)
where  are bank ﬁxed eﬀects and  are estimation errors.
Together, the system of equations (1) and (2) characterize the equilibrium in the credit
market. The strategic eﬀects between bank  and its  rivals are captured by the group of
parameters .I f  =1 , there is collusion, whereas if  =0banks maximize proﬁts
independently. The impact of the branch network is obtained from the coeﬃcients 1, 2.
The parameter 4 evaluates the extent of the impact of the local market characteristics on
granting new credit.
113T h e D a t a
T h ed a t a s e ti st h er e s u l to fm e r g i n gt h r e ed i ﬀerent sources of data. The ﬁrst dataset includes
information on the branches’ location. The second dataset includes unique interest rate and
credit data, which allows to distinguish between the household and the corporate sectors. The
third database gathers the regional characterization. The dataset consists of quarterly data
from the ﬁrst quarter of 1995 to the third quarter of 2002 and each observation corresponds
to a bank at each quarter.
Regarding branch location, the data are collected by the Banking Supervision Department
at Banco de Portugal. Whenever a bank establishes a branch, it is required to report this
event to the supervisor within a period of three months. The same time period is set for a
branch change of address, closing or other major change.
The data on credit and interest rate is collected from the Monetary and Financial Statistics
(MFS) of Banco de Portugal. The MFS are a monthly mandatory survey sent to all ﬁnancial
institutions operating in the country and includes information on end-of-period stocks and
ﬂows of credit granted to households and to non-ﬁnancial corporations. Data on interest
rates are based on the ﬂows of new credit granted. There was a major revision in interest
rate statistics at the end of 2002, with the purpose of harmonizing methodologies within the
Eurosystem, which prevents the use of more recent data. In fact, from 2003 onwards, interest
rate statistics began to be estimated using a sample of representative banks, instead of using
the whole universe of banking institutions, as before. Hence, there are several banks (including
small banks belonging to the seven largest banking groups) for which there is no interest rate
data after end-2002. Nevertheless, a longer estimation period would probably not be adequate,
given that the eﬀects of mergers should be more strongly and clearly captured in the years
immediately after these mergers11. Moreover, it would be a very strong assumption to require
that the pre-merger equilibrium holds for many years after the merger wave, as changes in
economic and ﬁnancial variables should also shape this equilibrium.
11For instance, Berger et al (1998) consider that the dynamic eﬀects of bank mergers should be analyzed in
the three years following the merger.
12Finally, we further collected data on the demographic characteristics of the districts from
Statistics Portugal, including total population by municipality.
3.1 Description of the 2000 Merger Wave
D u r i n gt h e1 9 9 5t o2 0 0 2s a m p l ep e r i o d ,t h eP o r t u g u e s eﬁnancial system experienced several
restructuring processes. Among the main corporate changes, we highlight the ﬁve most signif-
icant ones: (i) in January 1996, Banco Português de Investimento (BPI) buys Banco Borges &
Irmão (BBI) and Banco Fonsecas e Burnay (BFB); (ii) in December 1997, Banco Comercial
de Macau (BCM) changes to Expresso Atlantico; (iii) in September 1998, there was a merger
between BBI, Banco Fomento e Exterior (BFE) and BFB and the new institution is named
as BBPI; (iv) in March 2000, the group Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor (BPSM), which included
the banks BPSM, Banco Totta e Sotto Mayor Inv (BTSM Inv), Banco Totta e Açores (BTA)
and Credito Predial Português (CPP) is extinguished. The bank BPSM is bought by Banco
Comercial Português (BCP). At the same time, BTSM Inv is acquired by Caixa Geral de
Depósitos (CGD); BTA is created and CPP is acquired by BTA and ﬁnally (v) in September
2000, Santander buys BTA.
Among the main events, the ones occurred in 2000 are by far the most important, as they
involved major banks as well as major ﬁnancial groups. Among the seven major ﬁnancial
groups, four were directly involved either by selling a ﬁnancial institution or by acquiring one,
thus generating profound changes in the structure of the Portuguese banking market. Due to
the signiﬁcant changes occurring in 2000, we may distinguish between speciﬁc characteristics
of the pre-2000 period, which we designate as the pre-merger period, comprehending the
1995-1999 period, and speciﬁc characteristics of an after-2000 period, which we denominate
the post-merger period (including the 2000-2002 period).
To better understand the changes occurring in the credit market during 2000 we analyze
the evolution of the stock of credit and total number of branches in the country during the
1995-2002 period. The pattern is presented in Figure 1. The ﬁgure reveals that credit ﬂows
seem to peak at mid-1999, while the total number of branches increased more signiﬁcantly
13between 1995 and 1998. Figure 1 also reveals a decelerating trend in the number of branches
following the important consolidation move in 2000.
An inspection of the aggregate numbers in Figure 1 suggests that the merger and ac-
quisition activity in 2000 did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the total credit ﬁgures but that is not
necessarily so for the within group composition. In Figure 2 we present a closer look at the
corporate changes and compute the market shares of the total stock of credit for the main
ﬁnancial groups during the 1995-2002 period. We observe that the 2000 merger wave signif-
icantly changed the market share of some groups. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 3, the
banking groups involved in the 2000 merger wave experienced a larger gain in market shares
than the remaining banks.
We also observe that after the merger wave there was some increase in the dispersion of
interest rates of the larger banking groups (Figure 4). This heightened dispersion was mostly
due to a relative increase in interest rates oﬀered by the groups directly involved in the 2000
merger wave (Figure 5).
All this evidence suggests that the signiﬁcant changes occurring in 2000 may have had
important consequences in the credit market, namely on credit granted, interest rates charged
a n do nt h es t r a t e g i ce ﬀects among the ﬁnancial players. This paper analyzes those changes.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Overall, there are 71 banks in the dataset that are in operation for at least one quarter during
the sample period. Banks are grouped in 8 major ﬁnancial groups: we consider the seven
most important ﬁnancial groups that include 26 banks and one additional group including the
remaining banks in the sample12. Four of these banking groups were directly involved in the
2000 merger wave.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our sample for the stock of credit, ﬂows and
o t h e rv a r i a b l e sf o rt h r e ed i ﬀerent groups of banks: i) the four large banking groups involved
12As shown by Park and Pennacchi (2009), bank mergers aﬀect diﬀerently large and small banks, hence
justifying analysing them separately.
14in the merger wave, ii) the three large banking groups not involved in the mergers, and iii)
the remaining banks which were not involved in the merger wave. The average credit market
share of a bank belonging to the group of banks engaged in mergers is 3.4 percent, while the
large banks that do not belong to this group have on average 6.7 percent of the total stock of
credit. In turn, the smaller banks not involved in mergers have only, on average, 0.6 percent
of the credit market. This last evidence highlights the importance of treating these banks
separately and, hence, they will be excluded from regression analysis.
The average interest rate on the total credit ﬂo wc h a r g e db yt h eb a n k si n v o l v e di nm e r g e r s
is 11.1 percent (9.2 percent for the other large banks and 8.5 for the smaller banks). The
household market experiences higher interest rates (13.2, 10.4 and 10.2 percent for the groups
of banks under analysis) than the corporate sector (9.9, 9.3 and 7.9 percent, respectively)13.
These statistics refer to the entire sample period. We will analyze how the merger wave
aﬀected credit ﬂows and interest rates, both for households and for ﬁrms.
4 Analysis of Equilibrium in the Credit Market
The system of equations that characterizes the equilibrium in the credit market consists of
equations (1) and (2). As we have previously discussed, (2) includes the interaction of bank
 with each rival bank . In order to simplify the empirical estimation, we have reduced
the number of strategic eﬀects and considered the interaction of bank  with its main rival,
which is deﬁned to be the ﬁnancial institution with the lowest interest rate during the quarter,
min.14 As a consequence, the system to estimate is given by:
13Most of the banks in the sample operate in both the household and the corporate credit markets, even
though some small banks display null credit ﬂows in one of these segments in some quarters. All banks
considered grant credit to households and only two small banks never grant credit to ﬁrms during the entire
sample period.
14We have tried diﬀerent strategic eﬀects and the results do not change signiﬁcantly. For instance, we have
considered (i) deﬁning the main rival as the bank that has granted more credit during the quarter (),
(ii) the bank with the closest loan ﬂow in each quarter, (iii) the interaction of the ﬁve main rivals, (iv) the
average of the interaction of the ﬁve main rivals Xmax =1 5
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The system (3) also highlights the nonlinear constraint involving the parameters 1 and
3, representing a link between equations (1) and (2).
The results are presented in Table 2. The model is estimated for quarterly data and covers
the 1995-2002 period. Estimating the model for the full period allows for a characterization
of market structure in this period, which can be useful as a benchmark to assess the impact
of mergers. Columns (1) to (4) characterize the equilibrium for the total credit granted,
aggregating household and corporate credit, and columns (5) to (8) and (9) to (12) correspond
to the estimations for the household and corporate sectors. It should be noticed that, in this
setting, we are able to diﬀerentiate banking output into household and ﬁrm loans without
making any assumptions regarding their complementarity or substitutability, given that these
are two diﬀerent and independent markets. This implies null cross-elasticities of demand
between these markets, given that, by deﬁnition, customers cannot switch between these two
markets. Thus, specifying linear demand functions should not inﬂict problems which would
exist in markets where these cross-elasticities vary in response to diﬀerent strategies15.
In Table 2, columns (1)-(2), (5)-(6) and (9)-(10) are the results when we estimate equations
(1) and (2) independently, while the remaining columns consider the constraint presented in
the system described by (3). The system of equations is estimated using a seemingly unrelated
(SUR) model, which allows for cross-equations correlation of the residuals. All regressions are
executed using banks’ ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors.
Looking at the results for the aggregated credit ﬂows, in columns (1) to (4), we observe
15Berg and Kim (1998) empirically document such separability in the Norwegian market and present a
discussion on cross-market interactions when banks produce multiple outputs.
16that the total number of branches is positively and signiﬁcantly related to the logarithm of
total credit granted, indicating that local branching arrangements are an important factor in
liquidity provision16. In the SUR estimation, we obtain an estimate for 1 equal to 1.25, with
a -statistic of 3.98.
In addition, the interest rate charged by the bank is negatively related to the total credit
granted17. As expected, the interest rate charged by the bank , , is strongly and positively
related to banks’ funding costs18, . The estimate for the coeﬃcient 1 is, in the SUR model,
1.20, with a -statistic of 27.05.
Although columns (1) to (4) reveal consistent estimates of the determinants of the credit
and interest rates charged by the bank, the analysis for the aggregate credit ﬂows smooths
important idiosyncratic characteristics of the determinants of the household and corporate
sectors credit markets. Columns (5) to (8) present the results for equations (1) and (2) and
system (3) for the household sector and columns (9) to (12) present a similar analysis for
the corporate sector. The distinction across these institutional sectors highlights important
diﬀerences in these markets, thus justifying a disaggregate speciﬁcation rather than treating
t h ec r e d i tm a r k e ta sah o m o g e n e o u sm a r k e t 19.
We observe that the banks’ own number of branches positively inﬂuences credit granted,
both to households and to ﬁrms (the estimated coeﬃcients are 0.88 and 1.66, respectively).
In turn, the number of branches of the remaining banks is not signiﬁcantly correlated with
credit granted to households, as illustrated in columns (5) and (7), while it has a negative and
signiﬁcant impact on credit supplied to the corporate sector.
16In a recent paper, Corvoisier and Gropp (2009) argue that the widespread use of web-based banking
platforms should have decreased sunk costs and increased contestability in retail banking, as establishing
branches became less important. Nevertheless, the authors ﬁnd that even though this hypothesis may be true
for time and saving deposits, it does not hold for small business loans, where establishing a branching network
with local connections is still important.
17In the table, we omit the t-stats for this coeﬃcient in columns (3), (7) and (11), as this coeﬃcient is
determined by the constraint in (3).
18 is a measure of weighted funding costs, taking into account deposit and interbank funding.
19The lower number of observations in the regressions for households and ﬁrms is due to the fact that some
small banks show null credit ﬂows in one of these market segments in some quarters, as discussed in Section
3.2. Moreover, two small banks never grant credit to ﬁrms during the entire sample period.
17Looking at the macro determinants, Table 2 reveals that the impact of the GDP level
on credit granted is positive for both credit markets. Given that GDP reﬂects changes in
global macroeconomic conditions and also changing industry risk, this result conﬁrms the
usually observed pro-cyclicality of liquidity provision20. However, this impact is statistically
signiﬁcant only for credit to households. Moreover, local branch competition has a positive
impact on the credit ﬂow. This impact is fourfold larger in the corporate than in the household
sector21.
The evidence on strategic behavior, measured by the coordination parameter ,s u g g e s t s
that there is no collusion between banks, as  is always less than one. The statistical tests
on these parameters show that we can reject the hypothesis of perfect collusion ( =1 )i n
the corporate credit market, thus suggesting that banks behave competitively in this market.
However, for households we cannot rule out either the hypothesis of perfect collusion ( =1 )
or perfect competition ( =0 ). These results are consistent with previous evidence obtained
by Berg and Kim (1998), who argue that the mobility of customers in the corporate market is
stronger than in other markets, thus generating more competitive behaviors by banks. More
recently, Degryse et al (2009) show that ﬁrms may beneﬁt from switching banks after mergers
occur, what can be related to banks’ competitive strategies.
Having analyzed the determinants of credit ﬂow and interest rates for the household and
corporate markets, we can now determine how these parameters change following bank merg-
ers.
5 The Impact of the Merger Wave
This section analyzes the impact of the 2000 merger wave on the determinants of credit ﬂows
and interest rates. On the one hand, we are interested in the impact of the merger wave on the
20Controlling for GDP should capture the most relevant time ﬁxed eﬀects. To mitigate concerns about
potential cointegration issues, we also considered the GDP growth rate, having obtained broadly similar
results.
21The estimated coeﬃcient 42 is 5.36 for households (with a -statistic of 1.94) and 20.13 for ﬁrms (with a
-statistic of 6.23).
18credit ﬂow and interest rates charged and, on the other hand, we aim at determining how has
the merger aﬀected local branch competition and coordination moves in the banking industry.
In order to pursue this objective we consider two scenarios. The ﬁrst scenario determines
the diﬀerential impact of the merger. That is, we evaluate how has the impact of critical
variables such as local branch competition and coordination moves among ﬁnancial institutions
changed from the pre- to the post-merger period. In the second scenario, we explicitly consider
that the merger wave might have generated a new setup in credit markets in the post-merger
period. The magnitude of the merger wave has most likely induced changes in the interaction
between banks and possibly also in consumer preferences. Given these changes, the diﬀerential
analysis, usually conducted in the literature, may lead to biased and incorrect estimates of
the merger impact. Hence, we propose a new methodology for the comparison between the
pre- and post-merger periods, through the estimation of a counterfactual. In this estimation
we combine the pre-merger equilibrium setup with the post-merger observed environment to
answer the "what if" question.
5.1 The Diﬀerential Impact of the Merger Wave
We ﬁrst compute the diﬀerential impact of the merger on the equilibrium in the credit market.
In particular, we are interested in determining how variables such as the strategic behavior
and local competition change after the merger. In order to pursue this objective, we consider
a dummy variable  that has value one if the quarter is in year 2000 or after, and zero
otherwise, and run a modiﬁed empirical model of (3)22:
22The choice of the year 2000 is motivated by the large number of mergers observed, some of which envolving
some of the largest banks. As illustrated in section 3.1, these mergers had a substancial impact on market
structure.
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In this model, the coeﬃcient 01 captures eventual changes in the level of credit ﬂow
after the merger wave and 43 considers the diﬀerence in the impact of the local branch
competition on the quarterly credit ﬂow following the 2000 merger with respect to the impact
during the pre-merger period. Using the coeﬃcient 3 a n de q u a t i o n( 2 )w ec a nc o m p u t ea
similar diﬀerential eﬀect for the strategic interaction, ,w h i c hw en a m e.
T h er e s u l t sf o rt h ed i ﬀerential impact are presented in Table 3. Columns (1) to (4) present
the analysis for the total credit ﬂow (household plus corporate credit) and columns (5) to (8)
and (9) to (12) present the results for the household and corporate sectors, respectively. As
before, columns (1)-(2), (5)-(6) and (9)-(10) represent the ﬁrst two equations of the model (4)
without considering the non-linear constraint.
The ﬁrst row of the estimated coeﬃcients in Table 3 shows the results for the variable
. The negative coeﬃcients in columns (5) and (7) reveal that the quarterly credit
ﬂow decreased after the mergers for the household sector, despite the decrease in interest
rates (columns (6) and (8)). This suggests that there were important changes in market
equilibrium after the mergers, given that a pure shift along the demand curve would imply a
positive eﬀect on credit due to the decrease in interest rates. For the corporate sector, the sale
of credit increased after the merger, as observed in columns (9) and (11), and the interest rate
charged decreased, as shown in columns (10) and (12). Post-merger equilibrium loan rates
decrease when the merger induces large cost advantages relative to the increase in banks’
market power, as shown by Carletti et al (2007). Our results are consistent with Fonseca and
20Normann (2008), who argue that even though a merger involving the largest ﬁrm in a market
creates a more asymmetric market structure, asymmetric markets exhibit lower prices than
symmetric markets with the same number of ﬁrms.23
For robustness purposes, we considered the possibility that the eﬀect of bank mergers
t a k e ss o m et i m et ob er e ﬂected in credit ﬂows and interest rates. To test this possibility,
we estimated the same regressions, but considering that the dummy variable  would
take the value of unity only from 2001 onwards. The results for households remain broadly
unchanged. For ﬁrms, we continue to observe the negative impact on interest rates, but the
positive impact on credit ceases to be signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, the impact of the mergers
should have been felt almost immediately, as suggested by the rapid change in banks’ names
and identities. To test the hypothesis that the merger impact could have had immediate
impacts, we also estimated these regressions with the dummy variable  taking the
value of unity from 1999 onwards. We observe that, in this situation, the diﬀerential impact
of the merger wave on credit ﬂows looses signiﬁcance, thus conﬁrming 2000 as a sensible break
point.
Looking at the eﬀect of local branch competition, we ﬁnd that the impact was most
signiﬁcant for the corporate sector. In this credit market, we ﬁnd that the merger leads to
a decrease in the impact of local competition on the credit ﬂow. Hence, the positive impact
of local bank competition on credit granted to ﬁrms becomes slightly smaller (though still
positive and large) after the merger wave.
The strategic eﬀect of the main rival following the merger is presented in the last two
groups of rows in Table 3. In what concerns the market for households loans, we clearly reject
the hypothesis of collusion, though that conclusion does not hold for the post-merger period.
In turn, in the corporate loan market we always reject the existence of full coordination moves
between banks, even though  increased somewhat after the merger wave.
23In order to conﬁrm the validity and strength of these diﬀerential impacts, we tested for the existence of
a structural break after the merger wave, using a Chow test. In all the tests performed we reject the null
hypothesis of structural stability of the parameters.
215.2 Counterfactual Analysis of the Merger Wave
T h ep r e v i o u sa n a l y s i sc o m p u t e sad i ﬀerential eﬀect of speciﬁc variables and assumes that all
remaining interactions remain constant. However, this analysis does not fully take into ac-
count the structural changes which should have occurred in credit markets after the merger
wave. Given the magnitude and extension of the mergers, the way banks (and their costumers)
interact should have changed substantially after the merger. In this section, we assume that a
new scenario is created that inﬂuences all variables in the credit market. Under this scenario,
the evaluation of the diﬀerences in strategic eﬀects requires the comparison between the re-
sults for the post-merger period and the ones obtained from the estimation of the pre-merger
equilibrium using the post-merger data (counterfactual). The main disadvantage of this em-
pirical estimation is that we need to restrict the analysis to the post-merger sub-sample. The
main advantage is that we can analyze the merger impact using the post-merger environment
which is obviously a much more realistic assumption.
The way we construct the counterfactual for the empirical estimation is the following. We
ﬁrst estimate the model (3) for the 1995-1999 period and obtain estimations for the pre-merger
impact. We then use the pre-merger coeﬃcient estimates of this model for the 2000-2002 data
on exogenous variables to obtain the value of the estimated post-merger credit ﬂows and
interest rates charged by the bank.24 This means that these two estimated variables are
the credit and interest rates practiced in the post-merger period assuming the impact of the
market environment, strategic eﬀects and local market competition in the pre-merger period.
We also consider the possibility of ignoring changes in the branch network after the mergers,
given that the mergers should have had eﬀects on the structure of the branch network and,
most notably, on local bank competition. Hence, we also estimate counterfactual values for
credit and interest rates by assuming that the branch network remains unchanged at pre-
merger levels.
Table 4 presents the main counterfactual estimations. In the table, we distinguish two
24Given the recursive nature of the model, the estimated interest rates are used to estimate credit ﬂows in
the counterfactual.
22groups of ﬁnancial institutions: (i) the ones that are directly involved in the merger wave and
(ii) the ones that are not directly involved in the merger wave. By "directly involved" we
mean that the ﬁnancial group acquired or sold a ﬁnancial institution to a diﬀerent ﬁnancial
group.25
We begin by directly comparing observed credit ﬂows and interest rates in the pre- and
post-merger periods. After the merger wave, loan ﬂows were higher than in the pre-merger
period, both for households and ﬁrms. It is worth noticing that this trend was stronger for the
banks directly involved in the mergers, given that the remaining banks actually recorded some
decrease in loan ﬂows, specially in what concerns loans to households. Comparing interest
rates in the pre- and post- merger periods, we observe that there was a widespread decrease in
interest rates after the mergers occurred, partly reﬂecting lower banks’ funding costs arising
from lower money market interest rates during this period, as well as from access to more
varied funding sources after the integration in the European Monetary Union. However, the
data clearly show that banks directly involved in the mergers decreased interest rates more
aggressively than the other banks, narrowing their interest rate margins in order to attract
more costumers and, possibly, also reﬂecting eﬃciency and informational gains arising from
the merger process (see, for example, Sapienza (2002), Hauswald and Marquez (2006) and
Panetta et al (2009)).
In columns (3), (7) and (11), we present the counterfactual estimates of loan ﬂows and
interest rates. As described above, these estimates result from predicting these two variables
for the post-merger period, by taking into account the pre-merger equilibrium and the post-
merger environment. Hence, variables such as money market interest rates, GDP or number of
branches are considered in the post-merger period to obtain these estimates. In these columns
we also present the results of mean comparison tests between the counterfactual estimates and
the post-merger observed variables.
By comparing credit ﬂows observed after the merger with the estimated post-merger ﬂows,
25As previously documented, out of the seven major ﬁnancial groups, four were directly involved in the
merger wave and three were not directly involved.
23we conclude that loan ﬂows would have increased even more if mergers would not have oc-
curred. When total credit ﬂows are considered, the diﬀerence between the counterfactual
and the actually observed loan ﬂows is not statistically signiﬁcant, except for the banks who
were not directly involved in the merger wave. In fact, the latter recorded a decrease in
credit granted after the merger wave which would not have occurred if the mergers had not
taken place, according to the counterfactual estimates. This result demonstrates that mergers
induced important market shifts, with merging banks gaining market share.
Our results show that there are important diﬀerences between the evolution of loans to
households and to ﬁrms26.O nt h eo n eh a n d ,t h em o d e lp r e d i c ts that household credit could
be larger than what was actually observed (specially for the banks not involved in the merger
wave). On the other hand, the model predicts a slowdown in credit granted to ﬁrms, in
striking contrast with the acceleration actually observed during this period. The diﬀerence
between estimated and observed corporate loans was larger for the banks directly involved in
the merger wave.
The counterfactual estimates also suggest that interest rates would still decrease if no
mergers had occurred. However, comparing these estimates to the post-merger observed
values, we conclude that the observed decrease in interest rates was, by any means, larger than
that predicted by the pre-merger equilibrium, even taking into account the developments in
money market interest rates in the post-merger period. The most impressive diﬀerence comes
from the interest rate on loans to ﬁrms applied by the banks involved in the merger wave,
what may suggest eﬃciency and informational gains arising from these mergers.
Finally, in columns (4), (8) and (12) we present the results for the counterfactual estimates
when the branch network is assumed to remain unchanged at the pre-merger levels. This may
be a strong assumption, given that it is unlikely that the branching structure and the intensity
of local bank competition would not change between 1999 and 2002. However, without the
mergers this branching network would probably be considerably diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h eo n ea c t u a l l y
observed, thus making these results relevant for this counterfactual estimation. In this version
26These diﬀerences may have important economic implications, as shown by Beck et al (2009).
24of the counterfactual, interest rates would be the same as in the previous counterfactual
estimation, given that the model establishes that the number of branches does not directly
aﬀect interest rates charged by banks (see equation 4)27. However, in what concerns loan
ﬂows, the estimates show that if there were no changes in the branch network, the estimated
loan ﬂows would not be as large as predicted by the counterfactual which assumes changes in
branches. This result is specially strong for corporate loans.28
Using these estimates, we can decompose the merger impacts into several diﬀerent compo-
nents, distinguishing between changes in the exogenous environment and changes in the branch
network and market structure. This decomposition is presented in Table 5. In columns (1), (6)
and (11) we present the initial estimation error (for all banks, for the banks directly involved
in mergers and for the banks not directly involved, respectively), deﬁned as the diﬀerence be-
tween the predicted values for the pre-merger period and the observed loan ﬂows and interest
rates in this period. On average, this estimation error is virtually negligible.
In columns (2), (7) and (12) we present the eﬀect of changes in the exogenous environment
on loan ﬂows and interest rates, for the three groups of banks under analysis. This eﬀect is
computed as the diﬀerence between the counterfactual estimates for the post-merger period
when holding the branch network and market structure at pre-merger levels, but taking into
account changes in the exogenous environment after the merger wave (columns (4), (8) and
(12) in Table 4). In what concerns interest rates, the eﬀect was clearly negative and larger
than 2 p.p. Hence, a considerable part of the decrease in interest rates in the post-merger
period was due to changes in macroeconomic conditions. Regarding loan ﬂows, changes in
banks’ operating environment led to an increase in loan ﬂo w st oh o u s e h o l d sa n dt oad e c r e a s e
in loan ﬂows to ﬁrms. As discussed above, this result means that the counterfactual estimates
without changes in branches suggest that loans to households should have been higher if the
27In these columns, the interest rates, loan ﬂows and the strategic interaction variable were computed using
the values predicted by the model, instead of using directly the values observed. The results are consistent
under both hypothesis.
28For robustness purposes, we conducted several sensitivity tests on the deﬁnition of the post-merger period
(as done for the analysis of the diﬀerential impact of the merger wave). Despite diﬀerences in the magnitude
of the impacts, qualitatively the results are robust.
25mergers had not occurred (the opposite being true concerning loans to ﬁrms). The impact of
the changes in the operating environment on loan ﬂows was stronger for the banks directly
involved in the merger wave.
When changes in the branch network and in local market competition are considered
(columns (3), (8) and (13)), we observe a positive impact in loan ﬂows, when compared to the
impact of considering only changes in the exogenous environment. These estimates correspond
to the diﬀerence between columns (3) and (4) in Table 4, i.e., the diﬀerence between the
counterfactuals with and without changes in branches. Hence, when changes in the branching
network observed after the merger wave are considered, we conclude that loan ﬂows should
have been even higher if mergers had not occurred. This diﬀerence assumes a larger magnitude
in loans to ﬁrms. As previously discussed, interest rates estimates remain unchanged, given
that they are not directly inﬂuenced by the number of branches in our structural model.
Finally, we present the estimates for the impact of other structural changes (which includes
a prediction error), deﬁned as the diﬀerence between interest rates and loan ﬂows observed
after the merger wave and the counterfactual estimates (with changes in the branch network),
for these variables. In other words, these estimates represent the merger impact which is
not accounted for the change in the operating environment neither for the change in market
structure. For interest rates, this impact is negative and larger for the banks directly involved
in the merger wave, thus showing that banks decreased interest rates more aggressively after
the merger than what would have been predicted by the model if mergers had not taken place.
In what concerns loan ﬂows to households, we obtain a similar result: these ﬂows were lower
after the merger than what is predicted by the counterfactual analysis. In contrast, loan
ﬂows to ﬁrms were higher than those predicted by the counterfactual estimates, as previously
discussed, specially for the banks directly involved in the merger wave.
In sum, we observe that mergers have increased the amount of credit granted to ﬁrms
and decreased the availability of loans to households. Moreover, the merger wave induced a
stronger decrease in interest rates than what could be expected, thus beneﬁting consumers. By
decomposing the merger impact, we conclude that the decrease in interest rates was mainly ex-
26plained by changes in banks’ operating environment, even though the merger wave contributed
to intensify this decrease. The increase in loan ﬂows to households after the merger was mainly
explained by changes in the exogenous environment, given that structural changes generated
by the mergers had a negative eﬀect on loan ﬂows to households. Finally, the increase in
loan ﬂows to ﬁrms in the post-merger period can be mostly explained by structural changes
generated by the mergers, as macroeconomic changes would have implied a deceleration in
loans to ﬁrms during this period.
These results are broadly consistent with those resulting from the diﬀerential analysis
of the merger wave impacts, even though the counterfactual analysis provides a much more
rigorous and detailed framework to disentangle the merger impacts, by relying on a structural
model of equilibrium.
6 Concluding remarks
Bank mergers usually have important consequences in terms of bank competition, access to
credit or loan pricing. However, the eﬀects of bank mergers on these variables are hard to
disentangle from other market and macroeconomic dynamic eﬀects that occur simultaneously,
aﬀecting loan demand and supply, as well as its pricing. In this paper, we present a struc-
tural analysis of the impact of mergers in the Portuguese banking market. In the late 90s,
several large banks were involved in a strong and fast consolidation process, thus providing
an empirical setup to assess changes in market structure after the mergers.
Using a structural model, we derive the equilibrium in the pre-merger setting. Combining
this estimated equilibrium with the post-merger environment, we are able to construct a
counterfactual estimate of loans and interest rates. This allows us to compare the observed loan
ﬂows and interest rates with those resulting from the pre-merger equilibrium, thus assessing
the impacts of the bank merger wave.
We obtain several interesting results. The interest rates observed after the mergers were
lower than those predicted by the model, in the pre-merger equilibrium. This may reﬂect
eﬃciency and informational gains resulting from the mergers and translated into more com-
27petitive pricing. In turn, there are important diﬀerences between loans granted to households
and to ﬁrms: whereas loans granted to households were in fact lower than what would be sug-
gested using the pre-merger equilibrium, loans granted to ﬁrms actually recorded a stronger
growth than what could have occurred if no mergers had taken place. All in all, households
may have faced some constraints in access to credit after the merger, even though loans to
households recorded robust growth rates during this period. On the contrary, loans granted
to ﬁrms seem to have surpassed by a large extent the counterfactual estimates.
The counterfactual estimates also highlight important diﬀerences between the banks di-
rectly involved in the merger wave and the remaining large banking groups. The banks directly
involved in this process decreased their interest rates on corporate loans much more aggres-
sively than other banks. Simultaneously, credit granted to ﬁrms by these banks was also much
larger than what could have been expected if no mergers had occurred. In turn, the estimated
decrease of loans granted to households assumed a larger magnitude for the banks who did
not directly participate in the merger wave.
By decomposing the merger impacts through the use of the counterfactual estimates, we
conclude that changes in banks’ operating environment were the main driving force when
explaining the diﬀerences in interest rates and loan ﬂows before and after the merger wave.
Structural changes generated by the mergers contributed to intensify these changes in interest
r a t e sa n dl o a n st oﬁrms, but had the opposite impact on loans to households.
The structural model used to perform these counterfactual estimates allows to clearly
identify the eﬀects of bank mergers on credit and interest rates, isolating changes in the
exogenous environment and in market structure. Changes in market equilibrium resulting
from the mergers aﬀect signiﬁcantly banks’ decisions, as well as their strategic interactions,
thus demonstrating the importance of relying on a structural estimation method. All in all,
w eo b s e r v et h a tp o t e n t i a le ﬃciency and informational gains seem to haven been transmitted
to customers through lower lending rates and ﬁr m sh a v ef a c e dl e s sb a n kﬁnancing constraints
than they otherwise would.
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Notes: Market shares are computed by taking into account the total outstanding amount of credit. Banks were grouped into 8 major groups: the 7 largest banking 
groups in the banking system, plus one additional group of other group including all other small banks.  Figure 3




















e Not involved in mergers
Involved in mergers
Notes: Market shares are computed by taking into account the total outstanding amount of credit The group of financial institutions directly involved in the 
merger includes institutions belonging to financial groups that have acquired or sold a financial institution to a different financial group in 2000. The small 
banks not belonging to any large banking group are considered in the set of banks not directly involved in the mergers.
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Notes: Only the 7 largest banking groups are considered in this figure. The relative interest rates are computed as the average rate on new loans granted by each 
banking group relative to the average rate on all new loans granted in each quarter.
 Figure 5
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Notes: The relative interest rates are computed as the average rate on new loans granted by each banking group relative to the  average rate on all new loans 
granted in each quarter. The group of financial institutions directly involved in the merger includes institutions belonging to financial groups that have acquired 
or sold a financial institution to a different financial group in 2000. The small banks not belonging to any large banking group are considered in the set of banks 









Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Stock of credit
Total stock of credit 323 2751 5134 1.5 31866 232 5422 7270 0.04 37014 791 419 580 0.24 3268
Number of branches 323 175 249 1 1312 232 242 229 1 786 791 26 44 1 217
Market share (total credit) 323 3.4 4 0.0 26.1 232 6.7 8 0.0 27.4 791 0.6 1 0.0 3.9
Flow of credit
Total credit flow 323 2268 6064 0.2 39776 232 1903 2866 0 16420 791 314 555 0 3514
Credit flow (households) 323 318 761 0 5769 232 401 567 0 2750 791 41 78 0 437
Credit flow (corporate sector) 323 1950 5335 0 35655 232 1502 2341 0 13812 791 273 496 0 3116
Interest rates
Interest rate 323 11.1 5 3.2 25.7 232 9.2 4 3.8 20.0 791 8.5 4 2.6 23.6
Interest rate (household credit) 287 13.2 5 3.2 25.7 213 10.4 4 3.2 20.0 622 10.2 5 1.5 28.0
Interest rate (corporate sector credit) 264 9.9 4 3.1 23.5 226 9.3 4 3.8 18.8 736 7.9 3 2.6 22.3
Interbank market rate 323 5.2 2 2.4 9.1 232 5.0 2 2.4 9.1 791 4.9 2 2.4 9.1
Bank specific and demographic variables
ROA 323 0.003 0.0 -0.1 0.03 232 0.003 0.0 -0.1 0.02 791 0.001 0.0 -0.3 0.04
LC 323 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.0 232 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.0 791 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.0
POP 323 14.0 3.8 9.4 21.4 232 13.0 3.7 2.4 21.4 791 15.0 5.1 2.5 21.4
Table 1 - Summary statistics
Notes: The group of financial institutions directly involved in the merger includes institutions belonging to financial groups that have acquired or sold a financial institution to a different
financial group in 2000. All credit values are in Eur million. Market shares are computed by taking into account the total outstanding amount of credit and are displayed as percentages.
Interest rates are annualized and refer to new loans granted in each quarter. ROA is the return on assets of each bank, LC is a measure of local competition and POP is a measure of the
importance of each market to bank i in period t. LC and POP are defined in Section 2.1.
Banks involved in mergers Large banks not involved in mergers Other banks not involved in mergers
 







 Table 2 - Characterization of the determinants of credit flows and interest rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit
ln(number of branches) 1.224 ** 1.250 *** 0.849 ** 0.884 ** 1.644 * 1.658 ***
(2.08) (3.98) (2.48) (2.48) (1.83) (3.53)
0.038 0.000 0.014 0.013 0.068 0.000
ln(number of branches other banks) -0.897 -0.863 0.377 0.475 -3.237 *** -3.076 ***
-(1.13) -(1.23) (0.60) (0.69) -(2.84) -(3.21)
0.261 0.219 0.551 0.490 0.005 0.001
ln(rt) -0.063 -0.417 -0.224 -0.119 -0.416 -0.265
-(0.17) -(1.41) -(0.55) -(0.30) -(0.61) -(0.54)
0.861 0.158 0.585 0.761 0.541 0.589
ln(rit) -0.612 *** -0.194 *** -1.078 *** -1.155 *** -1.099 ** -1.197 ***
-(2.80) - -(4.32) - -(2.52) -
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000
GDP 0.032 0.031 0.078 *** 0.075 *** 0.013 0.008
(1.43) (1.46) (3.26) (3.08) (0.39) (0.23)
0.152 0.144 0.001 0.002 0.697 0.820
POP 0.085 0.069 0.012 0.013 -0.207 -0.199 *
(0.50) (0.88) (0.12) (0.12) -(0.70) -(1.70)
0.618 0.381 0.906 0.906 0.485 0.090
LC 8.119 * 8.277 *** 5.276 * 5.356 * 20.389 *** 20.126 ***
(1.66) (3.62) (1.76) (1.94) (2.88) (6.23)
0.097 0.000 0.079 0.053 0.004 0.000
ct 1.206 *** 1.198 *** 1.209 *** 1.210 *** 1.214 *** 1.213 ***
(16.28) (27.05) (14.73) (23.11) (15.77) (23.46)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rmin 3.876 -1.683 0.072 -0.110 0.134 *** 0.132 ***
(0.48) -(0.15) (0.07) -(0.09) (3.06) (3.51)
0.633 0.884 0.946 0.927 0.002 0.000
constant 5.597 5.234 *** 5.247 5.279 *** -2.423 6.304 *** -3.412 6.304 *** 26.635 ** 5.412 *** 25.161 *** 5.419 ***
(0.75) (7.64) (0.81) (7.57) -(0.40) (9.54) -(0.52) (7.89) (2.51) (7.39) (2.73) (7.04)
0.451 0.000 0.417 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.606 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.006 0.000
Lambda (λ) -3.3 0.1 -0.1
H0 = λ = 0  [Prob> χ2] 0.88 0.93 0.59
H0 = λ = 1  [Prob> χ2] 0.85 0.60 0.00
Observations 562 562 562 562 507 507 507 507 496 496 496 496
R-squared 0.90 0.79 0.92 0.75 0.85 0.68
Notes: All regressions include banks' fixed effects and robust standard errors. Robust t statistics are presented in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signficant at 1%. The estimations are
performed for quarterly data during the 1995-2002 period. Columns (1)-(2), (5)-(6) and (9)-(10) refer to the independent OLS estimation of the two equations in the model, while the remaining columns consider the
constraint included in the system, estimated using a seemingly unrelated (SUR) model. The interest rates refer to the new loans granted in each quarter. LC is a measure of local competition and POP is a measure
of the importance of each market to bank i in period t. LC and POP are defined in Section 2.1. Ct is a measure of weighted funding costs, taking into account deposits and interbank funding. Rmin is a variable
that measures the strategic interaction between banks, being defined as Rmin = (1/nbanks) * Ljt / Lit * (rjt - ct), where Ljt and rjt are, respectively, the loan flow and the interest rates of each banks' rival,
defined as that with the lowest interest rate in that quarter, in each market segment. 
Total credit flows Households Firms
System of equations System of equations System of equations
The t statistics for the coefficient associated with ln(rit) in columns (3), (7) and (11) are omitted, as this coefficient is determined by a constraint in the model. The lower number of observations in the regressions
for households and firms is due to the fact that some small banks show null credit flows in one of these market segments in some quarters (two small banks never grant credit to firms during the entire sample
period). Lambda reflects the effect of the rival banks on the profit maximization function of each bank and is derived from a combination of the estimated coefficients, resulting from the model.  Table 3 - Analysis of the differential impact of the merger wave
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit
AFTER 0.350 ** -1.604 *** 0.343 ** -1.628 *** -0.473 *** -2.001 *** -0.471 *** -2.003 *** 0.957 *** -1.938 *** 0.971 *** -1.939 ***
(2.25) -(8.07) (2.09) -(8.07) -(3.12) -(8.60) -(3.01) -(8.22) (4.38) -(8.62) (4.48) -(8.40)
0.025 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(number of branches) 0.948 0.974 *** 0.987 *** 1.052 *** 1.166 1.168 **
(1.60) (3.07) (3.01) (2.89) (1.31) (2.50)
0.110 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.192 0.012
ln(number of branches other banks) -0.925 -0.745 0.525 0.774 -3.421 *** -3.337 ***
-(1.13) -(1.05) (0.82) (1.13) -(3.03) -(3.56)
0.257 0.295 0.415 0.258 0.003 0.000
ln(rt) -0.036 -0.133 0.137 0.343 -0.716 -0.545
-(0.10) -(0.38) (0.33) (0.81) -(1.10) -(1.04)
0.924 0.704 0.742 0.416 0.273 0.298
ln(rit) -0.658 *** -0.310 *** -1.032 *** -1.064 *** -1.135 *** -1.268 ***
-(3.03) - -(4.13) - -(2.67) -
0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000
GDP 0.030 0.041 0.130 *** 0.130 *** -0.043 -0.045
(0.95) (1.37) (3.77) (4.01) -(0.94) -(0.91)
0.344 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.349 0.364
POP 0.133 0.130 * -0.022 -0.023 -0.220 -0.213 *
(0.81) (1.65) -(0.20) -(0.21) -(0.79) -(1.87)
0.417 0.098 0.842 0.830 0.427 0.062
LC 6.131 6.066 *** 6.442 ** 6.559 ** 17.591 ** 17.389 ***
(1.27) (2.63) (2.19) (2.31) (2.54) (5.46)
0.206 0.009 0.029 0.021 0.011 0.000
LC*AFTER -0.990 *** -1.021 *** 0.474 0.462 -2.295 *** -2.289 ***
-(3.10) -(4.02) (0.99) (1.47) -(5.04) -(5.21)
0.002 0.000 0.321 0.142 0.000 0.000
ct 1.056 *** 1.046 *** 1.033 *** 1.036 *** 1.069 *** 1.068 ***
(13.93) (22.71) (12.51) (19.30) (13.55) (20.68)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rmin -9.797 -15.475 -0.442 -1.147 0.625 ** 0.622 ***
-(1.26) -(1.34) -(0.39) -(1.01) (2.06) (4.47)
0.208 0.179 0.695 0.312 0.040 0.000
Rmin*AFTER 12.528 4.953 -3.663 -6.171 -0.493 * -0.491 ***
(1.13) (0.12) -(0.36) -(0.42) -(1.66) -(3.49)
0.259 0.901 0.717 0.675 0.097 0.000
constant 7.019 6.049 *** 4.598 6.102 *** -6.336 7.263 *** -9.142 7.247 *** 33.217 *** 6.198 *** 32.409 *** 6.202 ***
(0.89) (9.18) (0.68) (9.12) -(0.98) (11.25) -(1.36) (9.55) (2.96) (8.74) (3.53) (8.64)
0.375 0.000 0.499 0.000 0.325 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lambda (λ) -80.6 -0.2 -0.3
H0 = λ = 0  [Prob> χ2] 0.71 0.53 0.31
H0 = λ = 1  [Prob> χ2] 0.71 0.00 0.00
Lambda*AFTER (λafter) 25.8 -1.2 0.2
H0 = λ = 0  [Prob> χ2] 0.91 0.71 0.32
H0 = λ = 1  [Prob> χ2] 0.91 0.49 0.00
Observations 562 562 562 562 507 507 507 507 496 496 496 496
R-squared 0.90 0.81 0.92 0.78 0.86 0.73
Notes: All regressions include banks' fixed effects and robust standard errors. Robust t statistics are presented in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signficant at 1%. The estimations are
performed for quarterly data during the 1995-2002 period. Columns (1)-(2), (5)-(6) and (9)-(10) refer to the independent OLS estimation of the two equations in the model, while the remaining columns consider the
constraint included in the system, estimated using a seemingly unrelated (SUR) model. AFTER is a binary variable which takes the value one if the observation is on or after 2000. The interest rates refer to the new
loans granted in each quarter. LC is a measure of local competition and POP is a measure of the importance of each market to bank i in period t. LC and POP are defined in Section 2.1. Ct is a measure of weighted
funding costs, taking into account deposits and interbank funding. Rmin is a variable that measures the strategic interaction between banks, being defined as Rmin = (1/nbanks) * Ljt / Lit * (rjt - ct), where Ljt and rjt
are, respectively, the loan flow and the interest rates of each banks' rival, defined as that with the lowest interest rate in that quarter, in each market segment. 
The t statistics for the coefficient associated with ln(rit) in columns (3), (7) and (11) are omitted, as this coefficient is determined by a constraint in the model. The lower number of observations in the regressions for
households and firms is due to the fact that some small banks show null credit flows in one of these market segments in some quarters (two small banks never grant credit to firms during the entire sample period).
Lambda reflects the effect of the rival banks on the profit maximization function of each bank and is derived from a combination of the estimated coefficients, resulting from the model.
Total credit flows Households Firms
System of equations System of equations System of equations
  
 

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Credit flows (ln)
Total 5.76 5.81 5.93 4.72 *** 5.50 5.76 5.33 * 3.98 *** 6.16 5.88 6.68 *** 5.65
Households 4.10 4.77 5.26 *** 4.97 * 3.74 5.07 5.13 4.93 4.60 4.37 5.44 *** 5.02 ***
Firms 5.59 6.01 4.36 *** 3.86 *** 5.39 6.14 3.92 *** 3.26 *** 5.84 5.89 4.79 *** 4.43 ***
Interest rates
Total 11.46 8.20 9.53 *** 9.53 *** 12.18 8.92 10.71 *** 10.71 *** 10.39 7.30 8.06 *** 8.06 ***
Households 13.31 9.37 11.08 *** 11.08 *** 14.49 10.46 12.34 *** 12.34 *** 11.68 7.96 9.46 *** 9.46 ***
Firms 11.03 6.83 8.92 *** 8.92 *** 11.30 6.58 9.74 *** 9.74 *** 10.68 7.07 8.14 *** 8.14 ***
Banks not directly involved in mergers









Notes: The estimations are performed for quarterly data during the 1995-2002 period. The pre-merger period comprehends the 1995-1999 period, whereas the post-merger period goes from 2000 to 2002. The group
of financial institutions directly involved in the merger includes institutions belonging to financial groups that have acquired or sold a financial institution to a different financial group in 2000. The interest rates
refer to the new loans granted in each quarter. Columns (3), (7) and (11) present the counterfactual estimates for the post-merger period, by taking into account the pre-merger equilibrium and the post-merger
environment.Columns (4), (8) and (12) present similar counterfactual estimates for the post-merger period, with the difference that the branch network is assumed to remain unchanged at pre-merger levels.
Asterisks refer to mean comparison tests between the counterfactual and the observed post-merger variables. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signficant at 1%. 















































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Credit flows (ln)
Total 0.00 -0.80 1.05 -0.20 0.05 0.00 -1.22 1.14 0.34 0.26 0.00 -0.35 0.93 -0.86 -0.28
Households 0.00 0.97 0.23 -0.53 0.67 0.00 1.32 0.11 -0.10 1.33 0.00 0.48 0.37 -1.08 -0.23
Firms 0.00 -1.73 0.64 1.52 0.42 0.00 -2.19 0.90 2.03 0.74 0.00 -1.37 0.38 1.03 0.05
Interest rates
Total 0.00 -2.25 0.00 -1.01 -3.26 0.00 -1.85 0.00 -1.41 -3.26 0.00 -2.58 0.00 -0.51 -3.09
Households 0.00 -2.48 0.00 -1.47 -3.95 0.00 -2.45 0.00 -1.57 -4.03 0.00 -2.39 0.00 -1.33 -3.72
Firms 0.00 -2.45 0.00 -1.76 -4.20 0.00 -2.14 0.00 -2.59 -4.72 0.00 -2.65 0.00 -0.97 -3.62
Banks not directly involved in mergers
Notes: The estimations are performed for quarterly data during the 1995-2002 period. The pre-merger period comprehends the 1995-1999 period, whereas the post-merger period goes from 2000 to 2002. The group of
financial institutions directly involved in the merger includes institutions belonging to financial groups that have acquired or sold a financial institution to a different financial group in 2000. The interest rates refer to the
new loans granted in each quarter. The mean of the initial estimation error (1) is the difference between the variable mean in the pre-merger period and the value predicted by the model for that period. The change in
exogenous environment (2) is the difference between the estimated value for the after merger period keeping the branching network at pre-merger levels and the value predicted for the pre-merger period. The change in
the branch network (3) is the difference between the values estimated for the post-merger period with and without changes in branches. Other structural changes (4) are the difference between the values estimated and
observed for the after merger period. The total effect (5) is the sum of all the previous effects, being the difference between the values observed after and before the merger wave.
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